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I1 Introduction
The recent revival of economic  growth theory has renewed interest in the nexus of human capital
investment and growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995). Studies across countries show that human capital
investments  in Pakistan are performing  poorly: the school enrollment rate is low, school dropouts are
widespread,  and there is a distinct gender gap in education (Behrman and Schneider 1993; Sawada 1997).
Theory suggests that the low level of education in Pakistan may have a strong negative effect on the
country's long-term  macroeconomic growth. The microeconomic behavior  of Pakistani households
should underlie such a macroeconomic  movement, involving  the interplay of parental objectives  and
constraints faced by the households.
However, human capital is accumulated  through a complicated decision-making  process. The
educational outcome is typically  represented by years of completed schooling, which is a stock rather
than flow,variable. In this case, the current outcome depends not only on the current decision but also on
past decisions. Therefore, general reduced form solutions  will include the entire history of exogenous
influences (Strauss and Thomas 1995, 1974-75). Yet, such historical data on individual and household
characteristics  are rarely available. Because appropriate data are typically missing, the dynamic aspects
of education  are ignored in most of the reduced form empirical  literature. However, even if we have the
data that theory requires, introducing  dynamics by having the current period's outcome depend on past
outcomes'complicates  the estimation  procedure.
This paper attempts to overcome these two issues in the existing literature on education by
making two important  contributions. First, to examine explicitly  the dynamic  and sequential  aspects of
schooling decisions, we use a unique data set on the whole retrospective history of child education and
household background, which was collected exclusively for this analysis through field surveys in rural
Pakistan. This data collection itself contributes  to the literature, shedding  light on dynamic aspects of
education. Second, in addition to the data contribution,  this paper uses the full-information  maximum
likelihood  (FIML) method to cope with the complicated  estimation procedure of multiple integration  of
conditional schooling  probability. This method, combined with the unique data set, enables us to estimate
the full sequential model.
The estimation results of sequential  schooling probabilities  provide new and important insights
on demand  for education. In sum, five important  findings emerge from our estimation. First, the most
striking  feature discovered is the high educational  retention rate, conditional  on school entry. Second,  the
schooling  progression rates become comparable  between male and female students at a high level of
education. These observations  indicate that parents might pick the "winners" for educational
2specialization  and allocate more resources to them, regardless  of their gender. Third, we found that this
schooling pattern can be explained partly by physical and human asset ownership and parental income
and health shocks. Fourth, we found gender-specific  birth-order  effects that suggest resource competition
among siblings. These third and fourth findings are consistent with the theoretical implications  of the
optimal educational investment behavior under binding  credit constraints. Hence, this paper gives
important new insights for understanding the dynamics of household risk-coping strategies  and
educational decisions in developing countries. Finally, we found that the supply side constraints  of
education in the village significantly  restrict education, especially for females. The last finding suggests
the importance  of future research on the supply side management  of education.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes  the key features of human capital
investments  in rural Pakistan, which were identified from the field research. Based on initial observations
from the field, Section 3 applies the standard theory of dynamic schooling investment decisions. Based
on the theoretical framework, we derive an econometric  model with which we can estimate the
conditional schooling probabilities in Section 4.  Section 4 then shows estimation results of the empirical
model. The final section offers conclusions and policy implications.
2 The Key Features Identified in the Field
Our approach follows an iterative process of (1) initial  hypothesis, (2) field survey, (3) theory, and (4)
empirical  analysis, which is suggested by Townsend  (1995). Instead of directly implementing
econometric  tests based on an existing well-defined  data set, this paper starts with key features of
household behaviors discovered in the field. Modification of data collection was undertaken in the initial
stage, and the standard theory is augmented afterward according to the field observations.
Field surveys  were conducted twice to gather information  exclusively for this paper. In the first
round of the survey in February through April 1997,  the survey team carried out interviews in fourteen
villages of the Fisalabad and Attock districts of Punjab province. Then the second-round  surveys were
conducted in eleven villages of the Dir districts of the North-West  Frontier Province (NWFP) in
December 1997  through January 1998. Our field surveys  covered 203 households in Punjab and 164
households in  NWFP. Hence, 367 households were interviewed,  and information  on a total of 2,365
children was collected.' The combined data give a complete set of retrospective  histories of child
' The  selection  of our  survey  sites  was  predetermined,  since  we basically  resurveyed  the panel  households  that  had
been  interviewed  by the International  Food  Policy  Research  Institute  (IFPRI)  through  the Food  Security  Management
Project  (Alderman  and  Garcia 1993;  Alderman  1996). The initial  IFPRI  data  collection  was  based  on a stratified
random  sampling  scheme.  A detailed  description  of the procedure  of our  field  surveys  is summarized  in the
3schooling,  together with household and village level information.
The most striking feature  uncovered in the field is the high educational retention rate, conditional
on school entry. According to our survey data, years of schooling  averaged 1.6 years for all female
children in the overall sample, whereas they were 6.6 years for male children. On the other hand,for
children who had entered primary school, the average years of schooling  become 6.0 years for girls and
8.8.years  for boys. These numbers indicate  that after entering school, children's years of schooling
dramatically increase.
To examine the school progression rates in detail at different educational  stages, we utilize the
framework of estimating the conditional survival function. The Pakistani education system is composed
of five years of primary education, five years of secondary  education,  and postsecondary education. 2
Educational outcomes can be understood as a result of five sequential schooling decisions. The first
decision is whether to enter primary school (S*i), where S*, represents schooling  time of a child at T-th
educational  stage. For those who attended primary school,  the second decision is whether to finish
primary school (S* 2).  Then the third decision for primary school graduates is whether to continue to
secondary  school or stop education  at grade five (S* 3).  For those who entered secondary school,  the
fourth decision is whether to stop before grade ten or to graduate from secondary school (S* 4 ).  The final
decision is whether to continue beyond secondary  school-that  is, to enter college, technical, or teaching
school  (S* 5).
3
Let nk denote the number of students whose have completed  education of the stage of S*k ,. We
simply used data where S*k-I is not right-censored  at the education level k- 1. The set of individuals  whose
school attainment is at least  S*k.l is called the risk set at the k-th stage of education,  S*k, and thus nk
represents  the size of the risk set at the level k. Among nk students, let hk denote the number  of children
who have completed  education level k, and therefore hk = nk+1. Then, an empirical estimate  of the
conditional  survival probability at education level k would be hk/nk.  This number represents the fraction
of studenis who go on to a higher stage of education,  conditional  on the completion of the education level
k-  1. Also, this can be interpreted as the sample conditional  probability of school continuation to the
education level k.
The estimated conditional survival or school continuation  probabilities are summarized  in Table
2. As we can see in Table 2, the survival rate at the first entry-that  is, the probability of ever entering
appendix.
2 Strictly  speaking,  secondary  education  in  Pakistan  is composed  of three  years  of middle  education  and  two  years  of
high  school  education.
3  We assume  that  for those  who  did  not enter  a primary  school,  the decision  was  made  when  the child  was at the age
of six,  which  is the median  age  of primary  school  entry  (Table  1). We impose  similar  assumptions  for secondary  and
postsecondary  education.
4school-is  low both for boys (64 percent) and girls (24 percent). We can also note that the female
conditional schooling probability is less than half of the male conditional  probability at primary school
entry. After entering primary school, however, conditional  primary school graduation rates become 82
percent and 69 percent for male and female students, respectively. These statistics indicate that after
entering school, the majority of children remain at school. Another interesting finding is that while the
conditional schooling  probability is lower for girls than that for boys at primary school entry and
graduation and at secondary school entry, the conditional  schooling probabilities after secondary  school
entry are consistently  higher for females in Punjab province. The gender gap in education eventually
seems to disappear at the higher stages of education. 4 This finding indicates an important dynamics of the
gender gap in education,  which has not been pointed in the literature.
These basic statistics also suggest substantial differences in the degree of the educational gender
gap among districts. According to Table 2, in the Dir district of NWFP, the conditional survival rates are
consistently  lower for females at all stages of the schooling decision. The district differences seem to be
largely due to sociocultural  factors. For example, the custom of seclusion of women, purdah, is strictly
maintained in the Dir district. These regional divergences  in gender gap in rural Pakistan raise an
important policy issue. Alderman et al. (1995) pointed out that when the government  allocates education
expenditures,  disadvantaged  groups such as girls and children in lagging regions should be targeted to
assure  more equitable gains from schooling.
3  The Standard  Theory of Educational  Investments
Having discussed the key observations  in the field, the next step is to formulate a formal model of the
household's optimal schooling behavior, integrating  the key features. A possible interpretation of the
above findings is that parents might pick the "winners" for educational specialization  and allocate more
resources  to them. As an initial theoretical framework  to account for this household behavior, we employ
the two sqts of optimal behavioral rules. First, parents decide the intertemporal allocation of resources  so
as to maximize the expected total lifetime utility of the family. Second, parents also make a decision on
the allocation of educational resources among children, given the overall resource constraint of the
household.
4  We  also  estimated  the Kaplan-Meier  product  limit  estimator,  and  the results  are available  upon  request  from  the
corresponding  author.  The Kaplan-Meier  estimator  of survival  beyond  stage  k is the product  of survival  probabilities
at k and  the preceding  periods. Graphing  survival  probability  against  sequence  k produces  a Kaplan-Meier  survival
curve. Again,  at the primary  school  entry  level,  the school  survival  rate  is much  higher  for males  than  for females.
The slope  of survival  function,  however,  is flatter  for females,  indicating  that  gender  gap in  education  becomes
smaller  at the higher  levels  of education.
5We use a standard investment  model of education as the benchmark and apply it to the context of
rural Pakistan. The basic setup of our model is based on the seminal works by Levhari and Weiss (1974)
and Jacoby and Skoufias  (1997) on human capital investment  under uncertainty. In particular, we extend
the Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) model to a generalized  form with multiple children. Essentially,  risk,
uncertainty, and constraints on insurance and credit influence  poor Pakistani households' investment  and
consumption  decisions. Therefore, we formalize human capital accumulation in rural Pakistan as
households' sequential schooling investment  decisions under uncertainty and credit constraints.
Suppose a household with n children decides household consumption,  C, and schooling  for child
i, Si, so as to maximize the household's aggregated expected utility with concave instantaneous  utility
function, U(*),  given the information  set at the beginning  of time t, Q.  The infornation set, Q, includes
initial asset ownership and the whole history of household  variables.  Such a household's problem can be
represented as follows:
T-t
Mar E  E  P  U  (Ct,k  ) +  W (AT+I  Hc  T+I  X  H2 +I>  HnT+l  )I  | Q
S.t  A(+1  = LAt  + Y,  (HP ) +  Wi  w;(-Q  i  -3  Ct ](I + rt )
n Hc,,+ =H,c  + E[(St, q,t ) +ejt  i=l,  2,  *.,  n
i=l At + Y,(HP) + 1W,(1SE,)+B  2C,
1=1
B >2O,  HP, AO  and B0are given, AT 2 0.
In this problem, the objective function includes a concave function, W(.), of financial bequest and salvage
value of the final stock of the child's human capital. The parameter ,B  represents a discount factor. The
first constraint is the household's intertemporal budget  constraint. This household's consumable
resources in each period are composed  of assets, A; stochastic parental income, YX  which is a function  of
parents' human capital, HM;  and total child income, Elw,(I-Si,),  with w;  being the child-specific wage rate.'
Note that a child's total time endowment is normalized  to 1. The second constraint is the human capital
accumulation  equation. The human capital production  function,fte), includes the variable q, which
represents the school supply side-effect, the gender gap, and subjective factors. Among others, the
variable q is a function of a time-invariant gender indicator variable that takes 1 if the child is female and
5 We  assume  that  a child's  schooling  does  not change  the child  wage  rate  immediately,  and  accumulated  human
capital,  He;  is reflected  in income  after  the child  becomes  an adult. In rural  Pakistan,  the child  labor  market  does  not
seem  to  be segmented  by level  of education,  since  it is well  known  that  the wage  rate  is not sensitive  to education  in
rural  agricultural  areas  (Fafchamps  and  Quisumbing  1999).
60 if the child is male. Also, there is an additive stochastic element e, which incorporates possibilities such
as risk of job-mismatching  after schooling. We assume that e is independently distributed with E(ei,  In,) =
0 for all i. The third constraint represents  the potentially binding credit constraint where B is a maximum
amount of credit available to a household.
This stochastic programming  model has n+1 state variables: physical assets, A, and child human
assets, Hic., i = 1, 2, ..., n.  When income is stochastic,  analytical solutions to this problem, even without
human capital, cannot be derived in general (Zeldes 1989). However, we can derive a set of first-order
conditions  that is necessary for an optimum solution, applying  the Kuhn-Tucker conditions to the
standard Bellman equation. In the arguments  below, we will use the first-order conditions of the above
problem. 6
Now let us specify the functional forms of utility and human capital production functions. For
the utility function, we assume the constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) specification.
(1)  U(C,)  = a  -- exp(C,),
a
Note that a represents the coefficient  of absolute risk aversion.  For the human capital production
function, we also select the exponential function: 7
(2)  f(Si, ,qit ) = qit  [O -y y  exp(-S,  )S]t
where yo  > 0 and y, > 0 and it is easily verified thatfs > 0 andfss < 0.
Noting that parental human capital affects permanent income, let Ytp(HP)  and Y,T  represent
permanent and transitory components,  respectively, of parents' income, YXHf). Then, by definition,  we
have Y,(If)  = Y/P(if)  + Y/ with  E(Yn,S)  =YP(Hf) and E(Y,TIQ,)  = 0. Our further assumption is
represented by Y,  - N(Y/P(HI),  cr/)-that  is, parental income follows an augmented i.  i.d. normal
stationary process. Moreover, we select that following  particular specification for the permanent income
function: YtP(Hp)  = p Hpt  + g(H), where the first term in the right hand side represents that human capital
adjusted time-trend of income with parameter p. The second term, g(.),  is a general nonlinear function
that defines the form of parents' human capital specific wage profile.
There are two different solutions for this problem. First, when a household can borrow and save
money freely at an exogenously  given interest rate, the credit constraint is not binding. In this case, the
household determines the evolution of optimal schooling so as to equalize the net marginal rate of
transformation  of human capital production and the nonstochastic  market interest rate, that is,
6  For the full  derivation  of the first-order  conditions,  see Sawada  (1999).
7  For an alternative  specification  of the human  capital  production  function,  see Sawada  (1999).
7af/asS,  =1 + r,  V i.
af  /as1,-
Using the functional  form of equation (2), the optimal schooling  decision rule then approximately
becomes
(3)  S;  = X,, P  + Sl 1, V i,
where XPN is defined as




where g represents the growth rate of q, which includes  effects of school accessibility, gender gap, and
subjective factors, and Xis a matrix of proxy variables for g and r.  Equation  (3) is a linear difference
equation for the optimal schooling  decision, S*. This equation indicates that the optimal level of
schooling is a function of school availability  and quality, gender-specific  elements, and the market
interest rate. Hence, if the credit constraint is not binding, parental income or schooling  decisions of
other children do not affect the schooling  decision for a child. In this case, two separabilities  hold: one
for consumption  and schooling  decisions and the other for intrahousehold schooling allocation.
Alternatively, if the household is constrained from borrowing  more, the household effectively
faces an endogenous  shadow interest rate, which is given by the marginal rate of substitution of
consumption  over time. Under credit market imperfections,  the separability between consumption  and
schooling investment  decisions breaks down. The optimal condition becomes  the following equalization
of the marginal rate of transformation  to the marginal rate of substitution:
aflasi,  au/ac, 1 
= PE,_ 1 8U/C  I,
Also, note that the separability among different children's schooling decisions does not hold. Under these
nonseparability properties,  the reduced form schooling decision  can be represented  by the following
linear difference equation:
(4)  S,; = Xi,  C  +  S,;,  + 6 i.,  V i,
where XI3C  is defined as
_  _In_  _  _  _  1+a  a  a  2_  _  2  _
)  "  -(  I+a  )I+  (pP  +  )+  a  A  2(1+a)  2  a  j*)
(I)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(V
Gender  Gap  Olwnership  and Accumulation  Esx  Post  Ex Ante  Opportunity  Costs  of
Subjective  Factor  of Assets  Transitory  Income  Income  Instability  Siblings'Schooling
School Accessibility  (Precautionary  Saving)
8Note that ej,  indicates a mean zero expectation error of parental income Y,. We allow a possibility of
serial correlation of this expectation  error. In our estimation,  we use various proxy variables for X, which
includes  the following five components  (equation 4').  First, X includes the gender indicator variable, the
school accessibility variable, and household-specific  subjective  factors of educational investments. The
second component  of X is the ownership  and accumulation of human and physical assets. The third term
(III) shows that an ex post realization of transitory income of parents, AY,T,  has a positive impact on child
schooling. In contrast to a household with perfect credit availability, where parental income variable does
not affect child schooling, a credit-constrained  household faces a high marginal cost of schooling if there
is a negative income shock. This reflects that consumption  and schooling decisions are not separable
under a binding credit constraint. The fourth term (Ill') shows  the negative effect of income instability.
This term basically indicates that, given a positive third derivative of utility function, there is a motive  for
precautionary  saving as an ex ante optimal behavior against income instabilities. The positive
precautionary  saving negatively affects child education  since there is resource competition between  asset
accumulation and investment in education. The final term indicates educational resource competition
among siblings. For example, an increase in other children's schooling time, AS*  , Vj  # i, or its
opportunity cost, wAS;.j, decreases child P's  optimal level of schooling. 8 Alternatively, the wage earnings
of older siblings will enhance the optimal  time allocation to schooling  by decreasing WjAS;j.
Testable Restrictions
The important  testable hypothesis can be derived by comparing equation (4) with equation (3). We can
easily note that the four terms of the right-hand side of equation  (4)-terms  (II), (III), (III'), and (V}-
should be 0 under perfect credit availability. On the other hand, under the binding credit constraint,
proxy variables for asset ownership and accumulation,  transitory income, income stability, and sibling
variables should affect a child's schooling  behavior. Hence, our theoretical framework offers testable
restrictions  that characterize two different credit regimes.
The economic intuition of these results should be clear. The two terms (II) and (III) in equation
(4') indicate  that a household's overall resource constraint and life-cycle  considerations  will determine
the total amount of expenditure  devoted to education. Credit and insurance availability become
8 According  to equation  (4), the optimization  behavior  of a household  for  the ith  child  is conditional  on  that  for  all
other  children.  The optimal  choice  of child  i's schooling,  S*¶,  depends  on S*.i,  the optimal  schooling  decision  made
for a child other than i. We therefore derived a Nash equilibrium  of child educational decisions implicitly. Strategies
that  comprise  a Nash  equilibrium  at each  date are referred  to as Markov  perfect. The equilibrium  represented  by
equation  (4)  can thus  be interpreted  as the Markov  perfect  equilibrium  (Maskin  and  Tirole  1988;  Pakes  and McGuire
9especially important at this stage. If borrowing is allowed  under an exogenously  given interest rate, a
household can maximize the total wealth simply by investing in the human capital of each child so that
the marginal rate of return from educating each child is equal to the interest rate. However, if credit
availability  is limited and thus household's consumption  and investment decisions are not separable, the
household resource availability such as parental income and assets affect the cut-off shadow interest rate
for educational investments. For example,  when there is an unexpected income shock, credit-constrained
poor households have relatively high marginal utility of current consumption. This leads to an increase in
the cut-off shadow interest rate and a decrease in child education. In this case, implicit or explicit child
labor income can act as insurance that compensates for unexpected income shortfalls of parents. 9
4 The Econometric Framework
There are two empirical approaches  for investigating  the schooling decision-making  process, based on the
basic investment  model of equation (4).10  First, the traditional approach employs a simple linear
regression model for years of schooling  with various household background variables as explanatory
variables (Taubman 1989). However,  the problem of this approach is that the linear regression model
combines the sequential schooling  decision process into an estimation of time-invariant parameters and
therefore  parameters in the model cannot be interpreted  well as structural  parameters.
The second  approach fornalized the process of schooling  as a stochastic decision-making  model
(Mare 1980; Lillard and Willis 1994,  Behrmnan  et. al., 2000). The model explicitly investigates  the
determinants  of sequence of grade transition  probabilities. In other words, the probability of schooling  at
?h grade conditional  on completing schooling  at T-  1  th grade is empirically estimated. The model has a
substantial advantage over the linear regression approach since it gives estimates of structural parameters.
The statistical  foundation of estimating  such a sequential  decision-making  model was first provided  by
Amemiya (1975). The model framework  was then applied to estimation  of schooling grade probabilities
1994;  Besley  and  Case 1993).
9  In fact,  many  estimates  of schooling  fimction  using  household  data  sets  from  developing  countries  report  positive
coefficients  of current  household  income  variables,  which  imply  the existence  of credit  market  imperfections
(Behrman  and  Knowles  1999;  King  and  Lillard  1987;  Sawada  1997).
'O  In fact,  a third  approach  consists  of applying  the structural  estimation  framework  for  a dynamic  stochastic  discrete
choice  model. For a literature  survey,  see Amemiya  (1996)  and  Eckstein  and Wolpin  (1989). Yet,  given  a household
having n children, the household's schooling  choice set is composed  of 2" mutually  exclusive, discrete dependent
variables. Since n takes about seven on average in our households from Pakistan, the structural  estimation  of such a
model  will  be computationally  intractable.  Applications  of this  framework  to development  issues  include  estimates
of the gender  and age  specific  values  of Korean  children  (Ahn  1995),  an analysis  of sequential  farrn  labor  decisions
using  Burkina  Faso's  data  (Fafchamps  1993),  well  investment  decisions  in India  (Fafchamps  and  Pender  1997),
bullock  accumulation  decisions  of Indian  farmers  (Rosenzweig  and  Wolping  1993),  and  an analysis  of fertility
10with family background characteristics  as determinants  of these probabilities. For example, using a
Malaysian data set, Lillard and Willis (1994) estimated the sequential schooling decision model,
controlling for individual unobserved  heterogeneity. Cameron and Heckman (1998) constructed an
alternative choice-theoretic  model to examine how household background affects the school transition
probabilities. Other papers focus on only one transition out of the many sequences  of schooling process,
such as the transition probability of high school graduates  (Willis and Rosen 1979).
We will follow the second econometric approach and estimate the sequential schooling decision
model  jointly.  To estimate probabilities of the sequential decisions with an assumption of serial
correlation, we employ the full-information  maximum  likelihood  method. Recall that there are the three
levels  of education in Pakistan: primary, secondary,  and postsecondary. Educational outcomes are
assumed to result from the five sequential  decisions, as discussed in Section 2.
To formalize the sequential  schooling process, we can define an indicator variable of schooling:
(5)  Si, = 1 if S*it > O
= 0 otherwise,
where r indicates the Tth stage of education  and S'  is a latent variable and corresponds to the schooling
time variable, S*, in equation (4). Note that 3,i,  =  1 if child i goes to school at the re' stage of education.
We discretize the years of schooling  into five categories, and thus r takes on five values. With this new
discrete variable, the sequential process of schooling decision is described as follows: children are born
with zero years of schooling. If children become the age of six or so, some children enter primary school,
while other children stay uneducated. The uneducated children with no primary school entry, S*', = 0, is
represented by the indicator variable 6i, = 0. Having entered primary school (S*il  > 0 and 8i, = 1), some
children finish primary school (6,2 = I or S*¶2  > 0) while other children drop out from primary school (5,2
= 0 or S*' 2 < 0).  Then, of those children who have finished primary school, some enter secondary school
(58  =  1 or S*6 3 > 0), while others do not (d3 = 0 or S*a3  S 0). Given entered secondary school, some
children finish secondary school (°i4 =  1 or S*j4  > 0), while other children do not (3i4 = 0 or S*j4  < 0).
Finally, after finishing secondary school, some children enter postsecondary  school (3I5 =  1 or S*,5  > 0),
although  others do not (3i5 = 0 or S*j5  < 0).
By rewriting equation (4), the estimation equation for child i can be represented by
(6)  SIT,  = Xi  Pr  3  Ui  + 
where r =i 1, 2, ..., 5, and  ui,  --  S*i,,I  +  gKr.  X is assumed  to include  the gender  indicator  variable,  the
school supply variables, determinants  of the household preference,  household shock variables, and the
decisions  using  Malaysian  data (Wolpin  1984).
11sibling composition  variables. Note that S*io  = 0 by construction.
Under an assumption  that the decision making is independent  across stages, or equivalently,  ui, is
independent  across T, the sequential  model of equation (5) and (6) can be estimated by maximizing  the
likelihood  functions of dichotomous  models repeatedly  (independent error term specification)  (Amemiya,
1975). However, our theoretical result indicates that schooling  decisions are not independent  across
stages by construction. It is straightforward  to show that Cov(S*it,  S*i,r) ￿  0, since UiT  S*j.T  +  El,.
These correlations  can be explained,  for example, by some unobserved propensity for schooling  that is
stronger among the children who graduated from a certain grade than among  the children who did not
finish this grade.
Suppose that the joint probability density function of the error terms UIT is represented byAtu, 1 , u, 2,
uM 3, uA 4, uM 5). Then, for example, the probability of entering postsecondary  education, that is, Pr(8, 5 =  1),
can be represented by
(7)  Pr  (S*i5 > 0, S* 4> 0, S*g  > 0, S*,2 > 0, S*ii > 0)
f=  f  f  f  f  f(u 1,u 2 ,u 3 ,u 4,u 5 )dU 5 du4 dU 3du 2 duI
Xa 1 -XI 2j  -X3  -X,33  -X4j 4 -X,iP5
The direct calculation of such a high-dimensional  integral is computationally  involved and maybe
infeasible, as the integral must be evaluated at each step of the likelihood maximization. There are two
possible ways to deal with the problem. Both ways rely on the fact that the unconditional  joint
distribution (7) can be presented as a weighted sum of products of univariate distributions. If no
assumptions  are made about the form of the joint distribution  of the error terms of (6), u,,T  then, assuming
the common-factor  error structure, the joint distribution can be approximated  nonparametrically  by a step
function (Heckman  and Singer 1984;  Mroz 1999). Alternatively,  under an assumption  of joint normality,
the distribution of the error terms of (6) can be approximated  using Gauss-Hermite  quadrature (see Judd
1998). The first method imposes fewer restrictions on the error structure in the system  of equation  (6),
but it is less stable computationally. The likelihood  function that results from nonparametric  estimation
of the error distribution (7) is highly nonlinear, and our maximization  algorithm fails to find a global
optimum. An approach based on Gauss-Hermite  quadrature  demonstrated much better convergence
properties in our case, and this is the method we use for our estimations (we will refer to this method as
FIML further in the text).  The log-likelihood  function  3  for the system of equations (6) is then:
N  / U  2 U3 U4  R  \
-1=  J£  Log(  E  WZ  fi  W2  fi  W3 E  W4  PR|  P7  (XiT |T I  Vm.  i  VM 25  VM 3 MVm 4
n=1  m=1  m2sl  m3=1  m4=1  T=L
where N is total number of observations  in the sample,  PR'(*) are the cumulative distribution  functions
12for every equation in system  (6) conditional  on the common  factors, v's and w's are one-dimentional
quadrature points (nodes) and weights from a Gauss-Hermite  rule (Stroud and Secrest 1966), M's are the
numbers of quadrature points. As before, Xs  represent the equation specific sets of explanatory variables
and P's are the vectors of unknown parameters to be estimated.
The estimations presented in the paper are based on the approximation  of the probability integral
by Gauss-Hermite  quadrature with four nodes." Further increase in the number of nodes fails to improve
the value of log-likelihood  function. Identification is achieved through inclusion of the set of stage-
specific variables such as school supply variables, household human and physical assets, and household
income and health shock variables, as will be discussed in the next subsection. According to the
likelihood-ratio  test criterion, the independent  error specification is rejected in favor of the FIML
specification that assumes a joint normality of the error distribution.  12
5.1  Variables
As we estimate  the above sequential schooling  model, we start by inspecting the basic data
characteristics. According to the median age of school entry, children enter primary schools at the age of
six, secondary schools at the age of eleven, and postsecondary  schools at the age of seventeen (Table 1).
Moreover, our survey data show that primary and secondary  education last an average of five and six
years, respectively. Since the formal length of the secondary-level  schooling is five years in Pakistan, an
extra year in secondary  education in our sample indicates that grade repetition or a delay of secondary
school entry, which is quite common in Pakistani villages.
Table 3 summarizes  descriptive statistics of variables  used in the sequential  model of equation (6)
as the discrete dependent variable, S*i,, and covariates  of conditional probabilities,  X. According to our
theoretical model (4), X is assumed  to include gender gap indicator variables, school supply variables,
subjective  discount factor, physical and human assets, transitory income change, and sibling composition
variables.
The gender gap indicator variables are divided into two subgroups according to province. The
first gender variable is for Punjab province and is a dummy  variable taking I for females in Punjab
I  I Parameters  of the model  are estimated  by maximum  likelihood  using  DFP algorithm  (Powell  1977)  with  analytical
derivatives.  The variance-covariance  matrix  of the estimated  coefficients  is estimated  by approximating  the
asymptotic  covariance  matrix  by the so-called  "sandwich"  estimator  (see,  for example,  Davidson  and  MacKinnon
1993,  263).
12 Results  of the independent  error  term  specification  are available  from  authors  upon  request.  While  the independent
error  term  model  is thought  to provide  biased  coefficients  owing  to correlations  of sequential  decisions,  qualitative
results  of the independent  error  model  and  the FIML  estimates  are comparable.
13province and 0 otherwise. Similarly,  the second gender dummy  variable for NWFP takes 1  for females in
NWFP and 0 otherwise.  These female dummy  variables indicate that the share of female students
declined at the primary school entry level (Table 3).
The second block of independent  variables contains  the gender-specific school supply variables.
The first supply variable takes 1 only if the child is male and there is a male school within the village of
the child's residence. Otherwise,  this variable takes 0. The second supply dummy  variable takes 1 only if
the child is female and there is a female school  within the village. We can see that for primary school
entry level, 37 percent of male children do not face supply constraints, whereas only 18 percent of girls
have access to female schools in their village (Table 3).3
Third, we assume that a household's subjective  preference depends on the household's social
class or caste status. Traditionally, the caste status, called biraderi in Punjab and quom in NWFP, is
identified with an occupational position (Eglar 1960; Ahmad 1977; Barth 1981; Ahmed 1980). For
example, agricultural  landless laborers are strictly distinguished  from landowners. Nonagricultural
laborers such as casual laborers and artisans are also differentiated from landowners. This system  of
caste has prevailed in the form of social norms, and members of each class are expected to act according
to their social and economic status. Hence, the caste system indirectly constrains the educational
opportunities of low-caste children. In order to capture these sociocultural  effects, we include parents'
occupation dummy variables-farmers  with land, landless farmers or nonfarm casual laborers, and
business and government  officials. The default variable is those who are unemployed and/or at home
because of sickness or unemployment. According to Table 3, more than 30 percent of our sample is
composed  of farmers with land for all schooling processes. It is notable that, at higher schooling stages,
the fraction of children from landless farmers or casual laborers declines significantly. On the other hand,
the share of children of farmers with land ownership increases after secondary school entry. These casual
findings are consistent  with the sociocultural  background  of Pakistani society.
The fourth set of variables is composed  of household human and physical asset variables. 14 The
first two variables are time-invariant dummy  variables for father and mother's education,  which take I if
the father,or  mother has completed  at least primary school and take 0 otherwise. Household physical
asset variables include the amount of land ownership and a dummy  variable for tractor ownership. We
can easily see that all four of these household asset variables increase as the child education level
increases (Table 3).  Children who are studying at higher levels of education are basically from relatively
13 No village  in  our sample  has  upper-secondary  and/or  postsecondary  education.  This  implies  that  supply  constraints
such  as the accessibility  of schools  are severe  at higher  levels  of education.
14 Although  our  theory  requires  us to include  asset  accumulation  as independent  variables,  we  utilize  a total  asset
variable  instead  of its first  difference.  This  is simply  because  markets  for  land  and  agricultural  machinery  are thin  in
1arich households  of educated parents.
With respect to the transitory income shock variables,  the model includes  good- or bad-year
dummy variables based on household's subjective and retrospective  assessment of agricultural
production, wage earnings, and livestock income. The health shock effects are also considered by
including  dummy variables for the health of the household head and the wife, which take I if they are
physically inactive and take 0 otherwise. As Jacoby and Skoufias  (1997) pointed out, a distinction
between  unanticipated and anticipated components of transitory income movements might be important.
The health shocks might be interpreted  as the unanticipated components since these shocks are largely
unexpected. On the other hand, income movements  include both anticipated and unanticipated
components.
As sibling variables, we take the number of older brothers and sisters. Alternatively,  we can
incorporate more detailed sibling composition variables, separated by current schooling status. Yet, our
older sibling variables are predetermined, and thus we may be allowed to regard these variables as being
exogenous. The descriptive statistics show that there is a negative relationship between education level
and the number of older brothers and sisters (Table 3). This finding suggests that those students who
could obtain higher education are from households  with a small number of children. This can be a
reflection of intrahousehold resource competition or birth-order effect.
Finally, according to the age distribution of sampled children of the household head, the average
age of children is 20.5 in 1998. However, there is a large variation in age.  Some members are older than
50.  The age distribution indicates that there will be a potentially large cohort effect, and thus the
empirical model needs to control for it. Hence, we include age cohort dummy  variables.
5.2  Estimation Results of the Sequential Schooling  Decision Model
Columns in Table 5 summarize a set of estimated coefficients of the full sequential schooling decision
model for each school level. These results are a derived FIML estimation of conditional probabilities
represented by equations (7) and (8). Detailed descriptions and interpretations  of our FIML estimation
results are presented below.
Gender Gap
First, coefficients on gender dummy  variables indicate that daughters  have lower conditional schooling
rural  Pakistan  and  thus we  do not  observe  change  in  assets  frequently.
15probabilities  at the primary entry and exit levels than sons have. The female coefficients in Punjab
province  are smaller than those in NWFP at the primary school entry, indicating  a smaller gender gap in
Punjab. This regional difference seems to be largely due to the different degree of sociocultural
constraints. Yet the coefficients on the female dummy  variable are not statistically significant after
secondary  school entry. The gender gap in education seems  to disappear among the students who are
studying at seconrdary  and postsecondary  level schools. Therefore, schooling  progression rates become
comparable between male and female students at higher levels of education. Table 6 summarizes  the
discrete marginal change of schooling probabilities  with respect to gender dummy  variables, evaluated  at
mean dependent variables.' 5 We can easily verify that the marginal effects are different between girls and
boys at the primary school entry level, while the difference disappears at the secondary school exit level.
These marginal effects confirm the above interpretation  of the estimation results in Table 5.
Development  researchers and practitioners have argued that women are significantly less
educated than men in Pakistan (Khan 1993; Shah 1986; Chaudhary  and Chaudhary 1989;  Behrman and
Schnieder 1993). There are several possible explanations  for the distinct gender gap in education. For
example, the high opportunity costs of daughters' education in rural Pakistan may lead to apparent
intrahousehold discrimination  against women in terms of education. Because of the custom of seclusion
of women,  purdah, parents might have a strongly  negative perception of female education. However, our
estimation results represent that evidence is not so simple or monotonic. Although there is a distinct
gender gap in primary-level education,  the gap is likely to disappear among those who have entered
secondary  education.
School  Supply
The school availability  coefficients are positive and significant for female schools, while the coefficient  is
not statistically significant for male schools. This result suggests that the lack of primary and secondary
schools in the village clearly impedes  female education,  while supply-side  constraints are not severe for
male students. The marginal effect of primary school availability  within the village is represented  in
Table 7.'6,  According to Table 7, accessibility to a primary school within the village seems  to contribute
15 To calculate  the marginal  effects  in  a given  simulation,  the certain  value  of the variable  of interest  is assigned  to all
the households  in  the sample  in a particular  state. The  simulated  probabilities  are generated  for each  household  by
integrating  over  the estimated  distribution  and  averaging  the probabilities  across  the sample.  Next,  the value  of the
variable  of interest  is changed,  and  this changed  value  is assigned  to the whole  sample  of the households.  Then  the
new set  of simulated  probabilities  is generated.  The  marginal  effect-that is, the effect  of the changes  in  the particular
parameter  on the probabilities  of school  participation-is  calculated  as a difference  in  these  simulated  probabilities.
16  See  footnote  15  for explanations  of our  methodology  to calculate  the marginal  effects.
16to a 18 percent increase in a girl's primary school entry probability. Moreover, female primary school
drop out will decline by 16%. In fact, our qualitative survey data show that, in 32.5 percent of school
termination decisions, households listed the supply side as the main reason for their decision problems,
including  inaccessibility to school and the low teacher quality (Table 4).  A significant portion of the
gender gap in Pakistani education may be explained  by supply-side  quantity and quality constraints
(Alderman et al. 1995, 1996). Although traditional Pakistani culture requires single-sex schools,  the lack
of school availability affects female education more seriously  than male education  (Shah 1986). Parents
are unwilling to send daughters  to school if a female school is not available nearby. Since allowing girls
to cross a major road or a river on the way to school often involves the risk that daughters will break
purdah, parents will choose not to let daughters go to school. Moreover, sociocultural  forces also create
the needs for women teachers to teach female students in the village. It has been pointed that irrespective
of the monetary  or nonmonetary  incentives in the form of scholarships, girls will come only if schools are
opened with female teachers in each village (Chaudhary  and Chaudhary 1989).7 Even if a girl's school is
available in the village, a chronic shortage of women teachers imposes serious constraints on female
education.
Social Class Effects
The overall estimated coefficients of the social class variable indicate that, at primary and postsecondary
entry levels, children of business or government  official households have the highest schooling
probability among the social classes considered. The second finding is that the farmers with land
ownership  have higher level of educational investments  at the primary school entry level than landless
farmers or casual labor households. These results suggest  that the occupation,  which is traditionally
related to social status, affects educational investment decisions at the initial entry decision to schools  and
at higher levels of education.
'7  Although  the supply  of teachers  is constrained  in part  by the shortage  of women  candidates,  the village
environment  also  prevents  expansion  of female  teachers  in rural  areas. Attracting  and  retaining  high-quality  female
teachers  from  outside  villages  poses  a different  set of problems,  since  they  must  relocate,  gain  local  acceptance,  and
clear  the difficult  hurdle  of finding  suitable  accommodations.  Even  locally  recruited  teachers  could  be chronically
absent  from  school  because  of responsibilities  for their  household  chores  (Khan  1993).  Nevertheless,  there  is not
enough  monetary  compensation  to attract  women  to be teachers.  Provincial  governments,  for  instance,  provide
teachers  in  villages  with  lower  allowances  for house  rent than  teachers  in urban  areas. Moreover,  there  might  be a
17Parental Human Assets
Father and mother's education variables have consistently  positive and significant coefficients in all
levels of schooling  except at the secondary  school exit level. These estimation results indicate important
complementarity  between  the education of the parents and the child schooling investments. This
complementarity  is generated possibly by educated parents' positive incentive of educating children,
improved  technical or allocative efficiency, and/or superior home teaching environments,  as pointed out
by the preceding studies (Schultz 1964; Welch 1970; Behrman and others 2000). Subjective factors
might be important  as well. According Table 4, in 13.4 percent of cases, households listed "the
accomplishment  of the desired education level" as the primary reason of a child's school dropout. This is
a purely subjective reason, implying  that schooling choice may differ depending on ethnicity, network,
and social status (Psacharopoulos  and Woodhall 1985). The more educated mother and father seem  to be
better able to perceive the benefit of education than uneducated  parents, since they can estimate  returns  to
education more precisely.
Household Physical  Assets
At the primary school entry decision, while the tractor ownership variable has a positive and significant
coefficient, land ownership  has a negative significant coefficient. This asymmetry in two physical assets
might be attributable to the difference in complementarity  with education. In poor Pakistani villages,
tractor ownership is an obvious measure of a household's wealth. Hence, our results suggest that the
primary school entry probability of children is systematically  higher for households with wealth.
Moreover, it has been argued that technology and education  have complementarity  (Psacharopoulos  and
Woodhall 1985;  Foster and Rosenzweig 1996). It is likely that tractor operation  requires at least a basic
level of education. On the other hand, the negative coefficient of land ownership at the primary school
entry level might suggest that there is a complementarity  between land ownership and on-farm child
work, which results in less education of children.
At the postsecondary  education entry level, both tractor and land ownership have positive and
statistically significant coefficients on the conditional schooling  probability. At this level, household
ownership of physical assets seems to play an important  role in education decisions. In general,
households' resource availability extends  their self-insurance  ability and thus encourages  high-risk and
high-return  investment opportunities. Risk-taking and precautionary  saving behaviors may be closely
school  quality  problem  originating  from  the teacher's  low  level  of education  (Warwick  and  Jatoi 1994).
18related to physical asset ownership (Morduch 1990). The negative effect of accumulating precautionary
saving on educational investment  will be less severe for those households  that have assets.
Household Shock Variables
Negative income shocks discourage  schooling continuation significantly  at the primary school exit and
the secondary school entry and exit levels. Moreover, negative health shocks increase dropouts from
secondary  school. These estimation results are favorable  to our theoretical model under binding credit
constraints  (Equation 4).  In general, Pakistani households face considerable income instabilities. Risks
of disaster such as large income shortfalls, sickness, and sudden death of an adult member impose serious
constraints  on a household's resources, since there is a severe limitation on formal and/or informal
insurance and credit availability in rural areas. Accordingly,  exogenous negative shocks have non-
negligible effects on the household's educational investment  decisions. Pakistani households might adopt
perverse informal self-insurance devices by using child labor income as parental income insurance,
sacrificing the accumulation of human capital. 18
Sibling Competition
According  to the estimated coefficients in the sibling variables block, the number of older sisters seems to
be associated with more primary education for younger siblings. This finding is consistent with
Greenhalgh (1985) and Parish and Willis (1993) using Taiwanese data. Older sisters may extend the
household's resource availability, either by marrying early or by providing domestic labor. This suggests
that households are not discriminating  against all daughters,  although  the older daughters might bear a
large portion of burden under binding resource constraints (Strauss and Thomas 1995).
On the other hand, at the secondary school exit and postsecondary entry levels, the number of
older brothers, instead of the number of older sisters, increases schooling probabilities. These results
suggest that once a child is picked as a "winner" of educational investment within the family, his or her
education at the secondary and postsecondary  level is supported partly by the older brother's resource
contributions. At these higher levels of education,  an older brother's farm or nonfarm monetary income
contributions  to household resources might be more important and significant than a daughter's
nonmarket domestic labor contribution to the household.
1 Sawada  (1997)  and  Aldermnan  et. al.  (2000)  also  found  the imnportant  impact  of shocks  on school  enrollments  in
rural  Pakistan.
19Existing empirical studies indicate mixed results for birth-order effects-that  is, the sibling
resource competition  effects over time. 19 There is no consensus in the literature about whether birth-order
effects really exist, and if they exist, whether they are positive, negative, or nonlinear in form (Parish and
Willis 1993). Our estimation results suggest  that, under credit constraints, birth-order effects exist,  and,
more important,  the effects are specific to gender and education level.
6  Concluding  Remarks
This paper investigated  the sequential educational investment  process of Pakistani households by
integrating  observations from the field, economic  theory, and econometric analysis. The paper makes two
contributions  to the literature. First, we use the unique data set on the whole retrospective  history of child
education and household background,  which was collected exclusively for this analysis through field
surveys  in rural Pakistan. Second, in addition to the data contribution,  this paper employed full-
information  maximum likelihood  method to cope with  the complicated  estimation procedure of multiple
integration  of conditional schooling probability. This method, combined with the unique data set,
enabled us to estimate the full sequential  model of schooling  decisions.
The most striking feature revealed by the data is the high educational retention rate, conditional
on school entry. Moreover, we found important dynamics  of the gender gap in education, the significance
of shock variables,  wealth effects, and intrahousehold  resource allocation with our full sequential
schooling  model. These findings are consistent with a household's optimal education investment  under a
binding credit constraint.
Although  the demand for education cannot be controlled directly by the government, supply-side
interventions  will be effective. Our estimation  results suggest that, in addition to household demand
considerations,  raising the quantity of female primary schools has a substantial effect in improving
'1 There  are  two  possible  cases  (Behrman  and  Taubman  1986). The  first  possibility  is a negative  birth-order  effect.
As more  children  are born,  the household  resources  constramint  becomes  severe  and  fewer  resources  are  available  per
child. If this  per child  resource  shrinkage  effect  is dominant,  the younger  (higher-order)  siblings  will  receive  less
education  than older  siblings.  Alternatively,  the resource  competition  effects  might  decline  over  time,  since
households  can  accumulate  assets  and  increase  income  over  time. Moreover,  the older  children  may  enter  the labor
market,  contributing  to household  resources.  Therefore  younger  (higher-order)  siblings  could  spend  more  years  at
school.  This  is the case  of positive  birth-order  effects. Also,  an economy  of scale  due  to household-level  public
goods  might  exist,  since  siblings  can share  various  educational  inputs  and  materials.  Positive  knowledge  externalities
might  be important  as well,  since  younger  children  can learn  easily  from  the experience  of their  older  siblings  through
home  teaching.  In sum,  having  older  siblings  might  promote  the education  of a younger  child,  rather  than  impede  the
education  of that  child,  if  the resource  extension  effects,  scale  economies,  and  externalities  are larger  than  the
competition  effects.
20education in Pakistan. Indeed, the push to expand access to schooling by increasing the supply of schools
has dominated the agenda for education in developing  countries since the 1960s (Lockeed et al. 1991).
Yet remote and inappropriate female school locations  and resultant high schooling costs are still serious
problems in rural Pakistan. Hence, the cost-effectiveness  of providing primary education can be
significantly improved, if the allocation of funds is shifted toward recurring expenditures for construction
of female schools and employment  of more female teachers. These supply-side  policy interventions  have
significant potential for reducing gender biases in human capital investment. We should also note that
closing  the gender difference in education creates long-lasting  positive effects on economic  development,
since education of mothers relates to fertility and population over time. Many empirical studies show a
highly educated mother has lower infant mortality rate, fewer children, and more educated and healthier
children (King and Hill 1993).
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24Appendix:  A Summary of the Field Survey
Field surveys were conducted twice to gather information  exclusively for this paper. In the first round of
the survey in February through April 1997,  the survey team carried out interviews in fourteen villages of
the Fisalabad and Attock districts of Punjab province (Sawada, 1999). The selection of our survey sites
was predetermined, since we basically resurveyed the panel households that had previously been
interviewed by the International Food Policy Research  Institute (IFPRI) through the Food Security
Management Project, based on a stratified random sampling scheme (Alderman  and Garcia 1993). The
first district in our sample, Faisalabad,  is a well-developed  irrigated wheat and livestock  production area.
The second district, Attock, is a rainfed wheat production region near the industrial city of Taxila. In this
district earnings from nonfarm activities are the major component of household income: Then the second
round surveys  were carried out in eleven villages of the Dir district of the North-West Frontier Province
(NWFP) in December 1997 through January 1998. Dir is also a rainfed wheat production area with some
cash crop production such as citrus. There is a limited set of nonfarm income-earning  opportunities
within and around the district. However,  temporary emigration  to the Persian Gulf countries is common
in Dir. As a result, nonfarm income and remittances account for more than 60 percent of average
household income, according to the IFPRI data files (Sawada 1999).
In our retrospective surveys, we used three different sets of questionnaires. The first
questionnaire is composed of questions on basic child information  and retrospective schooling  progress.
The second  questionnaire collects basic household background  information,  such as household size,
permanent components of household resources, and fluctuations in household assets and income over
time. With the third questionnaire, village-level  retrospective information  was gathered by interviewing
local government  officials and/or educated village dwellers such as schoolteachers. In particular, we
collected information  about the year when male and female primary schools were built in the village.
These questionnaires seemed  to work well in the field. Farmers remembered  incidents related  to
child education  and enjoyed talking about their children. Each household interview lasted approximately
one and a half to two hours, largely  depending on the number  of children. We visited the villages without
prior notification,  and the availability of respondents  was uncertain in advance. Therefore, we may
plausibly assume that our attrition of panel households is determined  by a random process.
Our field surveys covered 203 households in Punjab and 164 households  in NWFP. Hence, 367
households  were interviewed, and information  on a total of 2,365 children was collected. The combined
data set gives a complete set of retrospective histories of child schooling,  together with household- and
village-level  information,  which make the estimation of a full sequential schooling  decision model
feasible. Moreover,  the field survey data set is matched with the IFPRI data files.  Since our purpose is an
estimation of the full sequential schooling  decision model, we use part of the IFPRI data files that
contains long-term retrospective information  on household and village characteristics.
25Table 1
Distribution of Age at School Entry
Percentile [OK  Primary  school  Middle school  Secondary  Postsecondary
as edited?]  school  school
Youngest 10%  5  10  13  16
25%  6  11  14  16
Median  6  11  14  17
75%  7  12  15  18
90%  8  13  16  20
Mean age  6.43  11.64  14.69  17.23
(standard  (1.74)  (1.73)  (2.11)  (2.54)
deviation)
Coefficient of  0.2706  0.1486  0.1436  0.1474
variation
Number of  1,150  685  451  177
observations
26Table 2
Sample Probability of School Continuation
Total  Faisalabad  Attock  Dir
Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female
Primary school  hl/n 1 0.64  0.24  0.65  0.33  0.69  0.34  0.62  0.17
entry
Primary school  h2/n 2 0.82  0.69  0.74  0.72  0.87  0.69  0.84  0.67
graduate
Secondary  school  h31n 3 0.93  0.53  0.97  0.34  0.89  0.59  0.94  0.64
entry
Secondary  school  h4Sn 4 0.59  0.71  0.47  0.87  0.53  0.75  0.68  0.62
graduate
Postsecondary  h5/ns  0.57  0.57  0.55  0.77  0.39  0.56  0.64  0.48
school entry




Primary  Primary  Secondary  Secondary  Postsce.
entry  exit  entry  exit  entry
Code  S 1*  52*  S3*  S4*  S5*
Dependent  variable
Dummy variable takes 1  if S,* =  1;  takes 0  if S* S.*+  0.45  0.79  0.85  0.61  0.57
=0, where  = 1,2,.
Gender variable
Dummyvariable=  I if female in Punjab  pu_g.en+  0.20  0.14  0.13  0.07  0.09
Dummy variable=  I if female inNWFP  nw_gen+  0.28  0.10  0.09  0.07  0.07
School supply variable
Dummy variable = 1 if male and there is a male  p_sup_m+  0.37  0.64  0.23
school within the village
Dummy variable  =  1 if female and there is a  psup  f+  0.18  0.19  0.03
female school within the village
Social class variable
Dummy variable  =  1 if household head is farmer  farm_wl+  0.30  0.37  0.37  0.42  0.37
with land
Dummy variable  = I if household head is landless casual+  0.44  0.33  0.32  0.27  0.27
farmer or casual laborer
Dummy variable =  I if household head runs  bus_gov+  0.17  0.23  0.24  0.23  0.26
business or is officer
Household human  and physical assets
Dummy variable =  I if father has finished  fed+  0.19  0.29  0.31  0.31  0.36
primary
Dummy variable = I if mother has finished  med+  0.02  0.05  0.05  0.06  0.08
primary
Amountof land ownership  p  land  13.39  16.85  17.35  21.31  22.31
(37.51)  (45.27)  (43.83)  (48.85)  (53.85)
Dummy variable  =  I if owns tractor  ptrac+  0.01  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.06
Household's  shock variables
Dummy variable =  1 if good year  p_good+  0.07  0.05  0.02  0.33  0.06
Dummy variable = I if bad year  p_bad+  0.06  0.06  0.02  0.33  0.06
Dummy variable =  1 if household head is inactive  p_hinact+  0.05  0.06  0.002  0.31  0.02
Dummy variable  =  I if wife of household  head is  p  winact+  0.06  0.05  0.01  0.32  0.04
inactive
Sibling variables
Number of older brothers  m_old  1.83  1.77  1.69  1.69  1.67
(1.87)  (1.82)  (1.63)  (1.63)  (1.56)
Number of older sisters  f old  1.56  1.57  1.52  1.53  1.50
(1.68)  (1.64)  (1.57)  (1.56)  (1.55)
Cohort variables
Dummyvariable= I if aboveageof40  age40+  0.11  0.08  0.09  0.09  0.10
Dummy variable= I if age between  35 and 40  age3540+  0.09  0.10  0.10  0.11  0.12
Dummyvariable= 1 if age between  30 and 35  age3O35+  0.12  0.14  0.15  0.15  0.16
Dummy variable  =  1 if age between  25 and 30  age2530+  0.16  0.2.1  0.22  0.23  0.21
Dummy variable  = I if age between  20 and 25  age2025+  0.17  0.23  0.24  0.23  0.26
Dummy variable  = I if age between 15 and 20  agel520+  0.13  0.17  0.16
Dummy variable  = I if age between 10 and 15  agelO15+  0.07
Number of observations  N  1,850  833  658  557  340
+ indicates dummy variable. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviation
28Table 4
The Most Important  Reason for a Child's School Termination
Reason given  Frequency  Percent
Subjective reason
Accomplished  the desired level  97  13.4
Economic reasons
Education costs too high (tuition)  128  17.7
Needed on farm or at home  72  9.9
Got ajob  55  7.6
Child-specific  reasons
Child is ill  23  3.2
Marriage  21  2.9
Child failed in exarn  55  7.6
Supply-side reasons
School is too far  44  6.1
Child does not want to go to school  191  26.4
(Mainly, teacher's punishments)
Other  38  5.2
Total  724  100
Source: Author's interview.
29Table 5
FIML Estimation Results of the Sequential  Schooling Decision Model
Primary  entry  Primary exit  Secondary entry  Secondary exit  Postsecondary
entry
Si2*  S 3*  4*  S 5*
Coeff.  Std. error  Coeff.  Std. error  Coeff.  Std. error  Coeff.  Std. error  Coeff.  Std. error
Gender variable
Dummy variable = I iffemale living in Punjab  -1.455 (0.152)***  -1.516 (0.569)***  -3.306 (0.359)***  0.165 (0.454)  0.443 (0.447)
Dummyvariable=  I iffemalelivingintheNWFP  -1.716 (0.134)***  -1.111 (0.571)**  -2.759 (0.453)***  -0.062 (0.466)  -0.475 (0.523)
School supply  variable
Dummy variable = I if male and there is amale  0.163 (0.140)  0.320 (0.423)  -0.304 (0.285)
school within the village
Dummy variable  = I if female and there is a female  0.748 (0.129)***  1.190 (0.414)***  1.463 (0.640)**
school within the village
Social class variable
Dummy variable  = 1 if household head is farmer  0.436 (0.143)***  -0.359 (0.424)  -1.582 (0.645)**  -0.549 (0.374)  0.391 (0.450)
with land
Dummy variable= I if household head is landless  0.178 (0.136)  -0.593 (0.419)  -1.331 (0.641)**  -0.022 (0.394)  0.835 (0.439)*
farmer or casual laborer
Dummy variable = I if household head runs  0.719 (0.164)***  -0.262 (0.471)  -1.088 (0.670)*  0.256 (0.433)  1.600 (0.500)***
business or is officer
Household human  and physical assets
Dummy variable=  I if father has finished primary  0.868 (0.112)***  0.543 (0.268)**  0.734 (0.310)**  0.221 (0.258)  0.555 (0.329)*
Dummyvariable=  I if motherhasfinishedprimary  0.818 (0.320)**  1.046 (0.571)*  2.438 (0.748)***  0.644 (0.478)  1.140 (0.549)**
Amount of land ownership  -1.971 (1.116)*  -0.673 (2.136)  5.504 (4.793)  1.465 (2.508)  9.201 (4.692)*
Dummy variable= I if owns tractor  1.199 (0.451)***  -0.416 (0.541)  0.377 (0.653)  #  1.246 (0.593)**
Household's shock variables
Dummy variable = I if good year  -0.074 (0.270)  -0.361 (0.539)  -0.653 (0.890)  -0.236 (0.360)  0.047 (0.531)
Dummy variable ='  if bad year  0.095 (0.291)  -1.031 (0.510)**  -1.202 (0.635)*  -1.075 (0.341)***  0.105 (0.533)
Dummy variable =  I if household  head is inactive  0.034 (0.337)  -0.781 (0.521)  -1.795 (0.447)***
Dummyvariable=  I if wife of household head is  -0.021 (0.300)  -0.191 (0.564)  -1.017 (0.418)**  -0.793 (0.600)
inactive
Sibling variables
Numberofolderbrothers  1.321 (2.199)  -0.801 (5.514)  5.186 (7.622)  20.098 (6.634)***  25.433 (8.588)***
Number of older sisters  4.934 (2.406)**  -1.259 (5.998)  12.774 (8.752)  4.393 (6.834)  6.596 (9.210)
Cohort variables
Dummy variable= I if above age of 40  2.164 (0.216)***  1.679 (0.600)***  2.539 (0.605)***  0.340 (0.422)  1.181 (0.594)**
Dummyvariable=  I if agebetween35 and40  2.532 (0.218)***  1.330 (0.488)***  2.522 (0.601)***  0.445 (0.411)  0.537 (0.528)
Dummyvariable=  I if age between  30 and 35  2.376 (0.196)***  1.447 (0.443)***  2.321 (0.548)***  0.171 (0.349)  0.140 (0.491)
Dummyvariab]e=  1 if age between  25 and 30  2.505 (0.191)***  1.612 (0.426)***  2.830 (0.533)***  0.066 (0.309)  0.597 (0.460)
Dummyvariable=  I if age between  20 and 25  2.554 (0.189)***  1.475 (0.414)***  2.212 (0.505)***  0.080 (0.312)  -0.166 (0.425)
Dummy variable=  I if age between 15 and 20  2.463 (0.194)***  1.077 (0.422)**  2.567 (0.544)***
Dummy variable=  I if age between 1O  and 15  1.843 (0.210)***
Constant  -2.354 (0.243)***  0.474 (0.762)  0.625 (0.821)  1.005 (0.509)**  -1.760 (0.704)**
Number of observations  1,850  833  658  557  340
Note: * = significant at 10%;  ** =  significant at 5%; ***  = significant at  10%.
# indicates  that it is infeasible  to estimate coefficients  due to colinearity  and thus dropped from estimation.
30Table 6
Marginal  Effects  of Gender Dummy  Variables
SI*  S2  S3*  S4s 55
aP(8  1)/1&'  aP(82=1 )/aC 2 ap(8 3=l)/at
3 aP(6 4 =1)/1&
4 aP(6 5= 1)/&
x
Male  0.6558  0.8314  0.8887  0.5987  0.5713
Female in Punjab  0.2485  0.5149  0.3281  0.6206  0.6563
Female in NWFP  0.1908  0.6539  0.43095  0.5900  0.4770
Note: See footnote 15  for the calculation  formula of the marginal  effects. The variable xX  stands for the r-th
education stage variable of our interest.
Table 7
Marginal  Effects  of School Availability
'SI*  Sz*  S3*
aP(8 =l)/az'  aP(o  =1)/8z 2 aP(&,=l)/az 3
Male/school available  0.039  0.050  -0.037
Female/school available  0.177  0.157  0.126
Note: See footnote 15 for the calculation  formula  of the marginal  effects. The variable zt stands
for the r-th education  stage variable of our interest.
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